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Note

Editor's

Padraig O'Malley

One

Part

New England Journal of Public Policy before we
new millennium. In the coming year the word itself will go through
many uses, many permutations of meaning, be subject of so much tendentious punditry,
idiotic speculation, inane commentary, and pompous prognostications that it will have
been sucked dry of meaning, and we will be left with a plethora of "millennium spe-

This

is

the next to last issue of the

usher in the

cials"

man
ties

and "the top one hundred of the millennium"

diet fads,

everything from cat food to hu-

of the millennium."

And
its

in

and of course your perennial millennium "special sales" and "personali-

being the next

to last issue

of the journal in this century,

kind: a venture into the global village to ascertain

are improving the

ways

in

how

it

will also be a first of

or whether we, as a species,

which we govern ourselves, the

lives

of the six billion-plus

inhabitants of this small planet, in securing the liberty and freedom of the individual,
the primacy of law and dispensation of justice, the enhancing of

human

potential, the

provision of work for the able, the construction of the groundwork for a better
all

—

life

for

dignity and respect, freedom from hunger, tolerance, adequate shelter, elimina-

new literacy, ending dictatorial and authoritarian
human rights, stemming the flow of hundreds of
little more than badly upgraded concentration camps,

tion of illiteracy, proliferation of the
rule,

promoting the

inviolability of

millions of refugees

who

live in

countryless and uncared for except for the unstinting efforts of underappreciated and

underfunded nongovernmental organizations and the

like,

and improving the health and

which three-quarters of the world is mired in cycles of disease
making some headway in closing the gap between the rich and the poor.

sanitary conditions in

and poverty,

in

All of which, in this strange
live in

New

new world of ours,

will

have an impact on the way

we

England.

In the past twenty years,

we have been

ization, democratization, free

and fair

suffused with words and phrases like global-

elections,

emerging markets, participatory de-

mocracy, consensual decision-making, and a proliferation of other catchphrases that
suggest improvement in governance systems both within countries and between countries,

yet the improvement

more

In particular, in this issue

dergone or are trying

to

all

deliberately, since

come under

often remains in the promise, not in the reality.
will look at the experiences of countries that

undergo the transition

authoritarian regimes, or

economies with

we

some

to

dictatorial point in

democracy from
between

the accouterments of democracy.

what

I

to

have un-

either totalitarian or

what we

free-market

call

use the word accouterments

constitutes the "accouterments" necessary for

democracy has

increasing scrutiny as societies, once the scourge of civil libertarians and

advocates of

human

rights, try to

abandon old ways and become members

in

good
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University of Massachusetts Boston.

Affairs,

New England Journal

of Public Policy

standing in the

new

global order. Notions of what constitutes national sovereignty are

more problematic than

and one person, one vote does not necessarily a democracy

ever,

make.

Even

in this limited

regard there

a

is

wry

irony.

The century began with Herbert

Asquith, leader of the Liberal Party in Britain, campaigning successfully for the abolition of the veto powers of the House of Lords. (At the time, legislation could be passed
by the House of Commons, whose members were elected by the people, but it could be
vetoed by the House of Lords, composed for the most part of hereditary peers. The
century ends with Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair introducing legislation to abolish

whatever residual voting powers, mostly delaying powers, hereditary peers have.) Were
an African country to vest such powers

would be

in, say, traditional

chiefs for the better part of a

by the fastidious custodians of democracy, themselves
often paragons of moral rot and obsequious decay, for its dereliction in adhering to
"proper" democratic norms. In politics, no matter how wide one cuts the swath, what's
good for the goose is not necessarily good for the gander.
Nor, of course, can notions of democratic governance be divorced from notions of
economic empowerment of the masses and sustainable development in poor countries,
century,

it

pilloried

which constitute the greater number of the countries under study

in this issue.

they have been instructed by the mandarins in the International Monetary

and the World Bank how

Keep

eign exchange.

to

run their

inflation low.

form of fixed inward investment

affairs.

To

For years,

Fund (IMF)

Maintain a stable currency to

attract for-

exchange flows, especially

attract foreign

to stimulate growth, cut

in the

government expenditure and

reduce the ratio of the budget deficit to gross domestic product (GDP) to some arbi-

chosen figure, which means that when the technical jargon

trarily

is

decoded those

countries are left with social safety nets full of holes. In short, get the government out

of the way and the market in
ciently

all its

glorious manifestations will allocate resources

and productively and for the benefit of

If matters start to

go a

little

effi-

all.

awry, either through circumstances beyond their control,

or failure to hold government expenditure in check, or to strike a balance between

mon-

etary and fiscal policy, or widespread inefficiency, lack of capacity or bountiful corruption, they are

"encouraged"

to

jack up interest rates to maintain the stream of capital

inflows necessary to keep the foreign exchange rates pegged at their current levels.

Exorbitant interest rates, unfortunately, choke off economic growth, leaving borrowing
countries

damned

if

they do and

damned

if

they don't. Naughty countries get slapped

with structural adjustment programs that punish the wicked and leave them even more
indebted to their would-be benefactors. (This regimen of deficit cutting and anti-inflationary measures that have been the hallmark of
since the 1980s
Jeffrey

is

called, for

IMF

structural adjustment

better nomenclature, "the

programs

Washington consensus.")

Sachs put the matter very succinctly.

The IMF bought
all else. If

and

want of

if

the

into the investment bankers' mantra:

exchange

rate stability

central bankers devote their reserves to a defence of the

IMF

dedicates

emerging markets

is like

its

exchange

above
rate,

funds to a defence of the central banks, lending to

shooting fish in a barrel.

Or

so

it

seemed

—

until a stam-

pede began in the other direction.

The IMF encouraged

central

banks from Jakarta

to

Moscow

to Brasilia to raise

interest rates to catastrophic levels to protect their currencies, lest they lose the

money managers. Of course, the money managers could see one
beyond the IMF: investors do not gain confidence when short term rates are

confidence of the
step

dozens of per

pushed

to

Africa,

and Brazil

at

cent, as they

some

have been

South Korea, South

in Russia,

points this year. Yet the

more these countries

defend their currencies, the more they incited panic.

tried to

1

— the prize
so
speak — of how a developing democracy should
— the Asian model with Thailands and South Koreas and Indonesias
— the pride and joy of the
—
supra-sovereign
One model

run

exhibit,

to

its affairs

its

international

has,

financial institutions

alas, collapsed.

The implications
to

make

for these countries in terms of the regulatory reform they will have

in their financial service institutions, are as important, if not

make

than the structural reforms they will have to
are to weather the ruin that rained

Or perhaps

down on

economies

their

more important,

governance practices

in their

in the last eighteen

if

they

months.

there will be a growing realization that structural reform in the public and

private sectors are intertwined, that regulation and transparency are necessary to both,
that there

the

same

is

a symmetrical relation between the two. They are quintessential sides of

coin.

You

can't flip just one side of the coin and leave the other in the

palm of

your hand.

Fukuyama argued in The End of History and the Last Man 2
that with the collapse of communism and the triumph of capitalism, the battle for
"ideas" was over, and that in that sense we had arrived at the cul-de-sac of history itself

Some

years ago, Francis

— a millennium of peace and
liberal capitalistic

prosperity

was

taken seriously, never

mind being

the subject of countless conferences, seminars, work-

shops, and reams of befuddling gibberish,
the

hand with the emergence of pan-global

at

democracy. 3 The fact that such a preposterous hypothesis could be

more outrageous

ments we now face

the thought the

in

more

perhaps as good an indicator as any that

is

seriously

world markets are as much a

it is

taken, and that the predica-

consummate hubris

result of our

as

the unpredictability of the future.

Until recently, the collective

wisdom assured

decent dollop of democracy had finally routed
organization.

after another,

as the system

economic and political
to bust, and the
appropriately named "contagion"
infecting one
other forms of

But with the Asian economies somersaulting from boom

financial equivalent of

economy

us that free-market capitalism plus a

all

AIDS

—

—

inducing the collapse of financial markets in dominolike fashion

imploded under the weight of

its

inherent contradictions, the triumph of

free-market capitalism has been called into question. Does the emperor ever have
clothes? History,

it

seems, has not quite finished with

itself

— or

us.

Traditional remedies have proved ineffective, leading one of the world's

more emi-

nent advocates of free markets, Paul Krugman, to publicly address the vexed question
of the emperor's clothes. 4 Should we, he asks, given the seriousness of the current

crisis,

not temporarily "scupper" reliance on the market. 5 Traditional economic nostrums simply haven't worked, he argues. If an afflicted country raises interest rates and taxes to
protect

currency,

its

economic growth comes

sound companies are brought

downward

spiral

capital flight

only

way

and

keeps interest rates low and
inflation.

to a grinding halt,

to ruin. If instead a country

What Krugman

out] is a solution so stigmatized,"

lets its

suggests

he

in the vortex

currency collapse,
is

it

of a

will trigger

heresy to free-marketeers: "[The

writes, not with the conviction of a

convert but with the resigned doggedness of one
to their logical end, "that hardly

and even fundamentally

caught

who must

anyone has dared suggest

follow his

it."

6

own

conclusions

The unsayable words

"exchange controls." 7
Globalization and the onward march of the free market, guided by the mysterious.

are

New England Journal of Public
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even divine wisdom of the Invisible Hand, have made nation-states virtually irrelevant;

we queue up

new global village, where the
room for all to flourish. All this

to apply for our visas to enter this

are greener, the land

more

and there

fertile,

is

pastures
as

is,

events of the last year so vividly illustrate, an extension of the end-of-history hype,

erroneous in the extreme, even subversive in the sense that rather than proving to be an
instrument that would reduce disparities in income and wealth distributions between
nations,

it

Many

has proved

itself

an adept instrument for the opposite.

of the assumptions underlying democratization that were articles of faith in the

mid-eighties and early nineties would be regarded, and rightly so, as sheer
the era of the global marketplace and instantaneous capital flows. Others,
the received orthodoxy, require a thorough reexamination.
cially those in Africa,

and more especially those

hogwash

in

part of

still

Emerging democracies, espeby

in sub- Sahara Africa, devastated

war, famine, disease, and without even the pretense of a tarred road, to say nothing of

an infrastructure, or parts of Asia and Latin America with low incomes and no savings,

have

little

They

or no control over their economic fate in a free-for-all market system.

are the procession of ghosts that follow their funeral corteges, the sad echoes of their

hollow frames a dirge

to the victims of travails

beyond

their

own making.

II

Last September,

much

how

of the world waited with apprehensive anticipation to see

Alan Greenspan, chairman of the United States Federal Reserve Bank, would act
with the global financial crisis threatening to plunge the world into recession.
well have waited for Godot.
ultimate arbiter of what's

Which

good

in itself is a sufficient

for the world, never

mind

It

commentary on who

to deal

may

is

individual countries, of

as

the

who

should suffer the "pains and arrows of outrageous fortune," the consequences of the
fallout of decisions

made by rapacious

speculators, opportunistic financial institutions,

and countries that have become old hands

at

manipulating the

IMF

and

its ilk.

Borrow-

The
weapon borrow-

ing heavily puts the onus for repayment not on the borrower but on the lender.
threat of large-scale default with the "contagion"

it

spreads,

is

the best

have for further assistance to preclude economic meltdown, a form of blackmail in
which the continued viability of an interdependent world economy makes the strong

ers

beholden

to the

weak.

But blackmail, insidious creature
mailer as well as blackmailed in

its

that

it is,

has a penchant for enmeshing black-

greedy claws.

HI
There

is

an increasingly invoked view that an

the underclass in a stricken country, but

is

IMF

bailout does

little

for the

poor and

of most assistance to the First World creditor

banks and currency speculators whose self-serving actions are often responsible for the
country's dire predicament in the

can count on an

IMF

first

place.

As long

as First

bailout to countries that go into an

safety chute that enables

them

to

make

World banks and investors

economic

free

fall,

they have a

risky loans and investments without having to

worry about the consequences of their financial transactions going wrong, and the
countries that can rely on the IMF as the lender of last resort have little incentive to
reform their often crony-oriented banking systems and address the corruption that corrodes their economies.

The IMF

itself

has

come under

increasing scrutiny since 1998. In the year since the

start

of the Asian

tional bailouts.

crisis in

One

year

financial holes they had

IMF

shape.

the countries

dug themselves

IMF

prescriptions, or other

economic woes of

abandon were

into with such careless

still

struggling to survive on

were themselves experiencing severe power outages. After

gencies and found

in interna-

rescue from the

to

in

worse

the countries in question. Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, and Russia,

bursement of funds, the

IMF had

itself going,

less than

cap

from the ultimate lender of

billion

disbursed SI 20 billion

had attempted

it

conditions for loans, had only exacerbated the

rather than being out of intensive care, were
tors that

IMF

September 1997, the

later, all

in

$10

billion

on hand

its

IMF

respira-

massive dis-

to contain future contin-

hand, to tap a line of credit to the tune of S24

last resort,

a faceless entity operating under the suit-

ably anonymous cover of the General Arrangement to Borrow.

which poor countries
To pre-

In terms of policy, the organization, once the oracle before

humbled themselves

in trepidation, is

becoming the focus

for severe criticism.

scribe for any one country tight monetary policy

which leads to higher interest rates,
consumer demand might be the
but when every patient swallows the same

cuts in government expenditure, and a reduction in

correct "treatment" for the ailing patient;

economic medicine

at the

same

deflation. Unless an antidote

is

will further harden the global

time, the result

is

a collective overdose: Jonestown-like

quickly found for resuscitation a worldwide

economy's

arteries

and recession

slowdown

will litter the landscape

with dead economies.

Economies asphyxiating on the last whiffs of financial oxygen are clutching desperempty canisters. One feature of the global economy in the final year of a

ately at the

century not particularly distinguished for

has in fact made

human

its

regard for

human

that technology

life, is

labor replaceable as a factor of production in ever increasing

areas of economic activity, and most tyrannically in emerging markets or those for

which

word emerging

the

is

an aspiration well beyond their reach. One-third of the

eligible workforce in the world

is

either

unemployed or underemployed,

who

are at least one billion people across the globe
their
to

do

own
so.

survival or the survival of their families. 8

Economic growth

the world faces as

it

is

that

is,

there

cannot provide the wherewithal for

Nor

will they ever

be

in a position

The problem
what to do with

increasingly of the non-job creating kind.

straddles the cusp of the twenty-first century

is

people.

"For

nomic

its

swiftness and confounding of experts, the evaporation of the Asian 'eco-

miracle' probably ranks only second to the unraveling of soviet socialism as the

greatest surprise of the last half century," says

Research

Institute at

Walden Berro,

Chulalongkorn University

in

a

member

of the Social

Bangkok. 9 And with the evaporation

of the miracle some of the world's most cherished shibboleths regarding the building
blocks for economic growth and the consolidation of democratic governance crumbled
as the foundations upon which they were constructed collapsed in the financial mud
slide that swept

What

away everything

in its accelerating path.

should have been of most immediate concern

is

why

the international financial

— the IMF and the World Bank
which had guided
and
some cases been
prime movers
remarkable transformation of these
economies — could have been so uncomprehending of what was happening around

institutions
in

in particular, institutions

the

in the

them, so inept in their forecasting, so blind to the fault lines

at the

economic seams of

these countries, so impercipient of the financial practices that flourished under their

very noses, and yet so dogmatically sure of themselves

when

it

came

to prescribing

the

"adjustments" countries the world over, especially the poorer ones, would have to put

New England Journal of Public Policy

into practice before they could receive the aid

the rest of the global

vital to

economy, could have gotten

Asia, which send one-quarter of the global

it

economy

footed, bewildered, and at a loss to give a reason for

symptoms of imminent

ered in hindsight that the

only

we were

We

months

lifelines to

them

into recession, found
it all,

disintegration

flat-

of course, they discov-

until,

were there

all

the time,

too busy applauding success to see the rotten apple at the core.

were treated

Academy

keeping open their

so wrong, that the collapses across

to the

IMF

wise words of the senior

official

who

told the

Royal

of Morocco that Indonesia was within reach of eliminating poverty. Four

World Bank's Indonesia specialist was predicting
some 50 million people, might lose their jobs in a

later the

Indonesians, or

nomic meltdown. 10
Or more incomprehensible

still:

the

IMF,

1997 annual

in its

that

up

to

one

in four

catastrophic eco-

report,

wrote that "direc-

welcomed Korea's continued macroeconomic performance [and] praised the au11
thorities for [its] enviable fiscal record."
Three months later, the Korean government
was negotiating with the same IMF for a $57 billion bailout to prevent the world's eleventh largest economy from going down the global drain.
Or who was held to account in the IMF, that most circumspect of organizations for
tors

the
its

most noncircumspect report

that "in [Southeast Asia], the region is poised to extend

success into the twenty-first century and governments

ing this process"? This confidence

was rooted

principles, in [Southeast Asia's] tradition of,

still

have a major role

in "the region's strong

and commitment

in driv-

macroeconomic

to, efficient

allocation of

investment, and in the widespread belief that the external environment would continue
to

be supportive." 12 Less than a year

severely wanting.

The "Asian
sions, for all

The

crisis,

Tigers," the

it

later,

the

IMF

decried Asia's "fundamentals" as

argued, was "mostly home-grown."

IMF's models of

emerging markets, were

now

probity, before their ignominious implo-

harshly

condemned

for the laxity of their

banking systems, and a new phrase, "crony capitalism," was coined

The

to describe their

were quarantined, confined to their cages before the contagion
could spread. But the damage was done; the red meat of their financial entrails poisoned, and the contagion spread: hence the fear and loathing in other emerging markets.

disgrace.

Some

tigers

analysts sought

After

all

more profound meanings:

[they expostulated], capitalism

ment funds
capitalism

efficiently. In this case,
is

it

is

supposed

didn't.

not just an economic system.

to excel at allocating invest-

The deeper explanation

It is

is

that

market

also a set of cultural values that

emphasizes the virtue of competition, the legitimacy of profit, and the value of freedom. These values are not universally shared. Other countries have organized

economic systems around different values and politics.
As a result, spreading capitalism is not simply an exercise
neering. It is an assault on other nations culture and politics
'

in

economic engi-

that almost guaran-

Even when some countries adopt some of the trappings of capitaldo not embrace the basic values that make the system work. This is what
happened. Led by the U.S., global agencies (the World Trade Organization, the

tees

a

collision..

ism, they

Monetary Fund) sought to persuade poorer countries to become more
open to trade and global capital. These countries tried to maximise the benefits of
the process while minimizing changes to their politics and commerce. [My italics]
International

Thus:
Mutual deception flourished. Countries like Korea and Russia pretended that they
had. American, European, and Japanese bankers, executives, and government

8

on the basis of incomplete or
if

And

— or might become

true. Loans were made
Or they were made on the faith that,
government, the IMF) would cover the losses. n

pretended the claims were true

officials

faulty statements.

a loan went sour, someone (the
thus:

On

Global capitalism has become a dangerous hybrid.
mitted huge sums and expected high returns.

On

through bank loans, bond issues, and stock offerings
operating according to the

strict

the one hand, investors

—

and

Crony

loss.

—

not

capital-

bribes; favoritism for the well-

1997, a group called Transparency International ranked corruption in

connected. In

Not

fifty-two countries as judged by global executives and country specialists.

and Thailand fourteenth.

surprisingly, Russia ranked fourth, Indonesia seventh,

But

com-

often went

who were

borrowers

to

rules of efficiency or profit

ism often meant corruption: contracts won with

money

the other, the

capital

flowed

freely,

and self-deception prevailed. Banks collected

interest

on loans. "Emerging market" mutual funds rose, because local stocks were buoyed
by new investment money. While everyone enjoyed profits, there was a suspension
of belief.

Now

comes

the reckoning. Capital flight has forced

most developing

countries to conserve scarce foreign exchange.

Countries cannot expand their economies unless they replenish their foreign

exchange reserves of hard currencies. 14

Not much mention is made here of the fact that every time the IMF bails out one
more emerging market economy that has hit the economic dust, it is using the tax dollars

of the developed world, not to bail out the countries in distress but the commercial

made

financial institutions in the developed countries that
first

place. Thus, the

commercial loans of financial

emerging markets are

IMF

to step in

virtually risk-free, since if things

and more or

less secure their

the questionable loans in the

institutions in the First

go

sour, they can

World

to

count on the

"bad" loans, while the cost of the defective

and unwise decisions of these supposedly free-market
taxpayers in the wealthy countries through the

IMF

institutions are

channeled via

onto the backs of the miserable

millions in the poor countries, once the beneficiaries of Western financial largess,

have

to shoulder the

burden of the stringent repayment conditions the

—

IMF

making the bailout loans. Something is wrong here
not merely wrong
were conspiratorially inclined, deviously wrong. The poor ultimately pay

who

attaches to

but, if

one

for the mis-

takes of the rich.

rv

Some

of the variables that had yet to make their

First,

whether the turnabout

conveys a permanence.
unless Pacific

China

Rim

to devalue

A

stronger yen

exports

full

in the fortunes of the
is

become more

weight

felt.

yen assumes a

critical

mass

that

the precise antidote for Asia's malaise, for

competitive, thus taking the pressure off

and boosting the buying power of Japanese consumers, recovery of

any substantial extent will remain problematical.
Second, the reform of Japan's banking system must be seen to be getting off to a
real start. Japan's

government has committed

banking system, a sum that
dubious, and
starts

if

is

equal to almost

itself to injecting
all

$600

billion into the

of Japan's bad loans. But

many

are

past practices are anything to go by, the well-chronicled pattern of false

feeds skepticism.

However, the known but unacknowledged and unspoken

fact is that Japan's

banks are

New England Journal of Public Policy

bankrupt, with bad loans and defaults amounting to one trillion dollars

- an amount

equal to roughly 25 percent of gross national product (GNP). (For a comparative yardstick use the Savings
out,

huge though

were

it

and Loans crash

1980s in the United States.) The

in the late

bail-

was, amounted to 2 per cent of GNP. If the Japanese government

to "refinance" the

banking system,

it

would drive the country

into a possible de-

pression, and as goes Japan, so goes the rest of Asia.

The impact of

economy going

the world's second largest

belly-up, followed by per-

vasive depression throughout Asia, which accounts for one-third of the world's output,

would,

at the least,

induce recession in the United States, and most probably in the rest

of the world. If Japan were to

from the United

States,

with

try to deal

Europe, and

much

position of having a banking system that

world's largest creditor nation

— banks

is

all

banking

its

by

crisis

of the rest of the world
functional only in

calling in loans due

—

in the ironic

it is

name while being

over the world would teeter and

fall

the
as they

would be unable to cover their repayments, thus triggering a worldwide recession,
which in the long-run would do little to help Japan. 15
Third, after the

IMF

and twenty of the world's richest countries reluctantly

that they did so reluctantly

was a harbinger of eventual

(the fact

agreed to finance a

failure)

$41.5 billion loan package for Brazil in return for massive austerity cuts on the parts of
the Brazilians (Brazil's foreign reserves had fallen from $75 billion to $43 billion be-

tween August and November 1998), the deal did not close the financial dikes, and two
months after the bailout was put together, Brazil's currency, the real, was effectively
devalued by 8 percent: the repercussions will be

Mexico, Venezuela, Chile; indeed,

And

the repercussions will

be

felt

throughout the Americas, including

in all countries with

felt in

the United States.

the consequences will "merely" envelop

weak current account balances.
The question again is whether

most of the Americas

in

a recession or whether

an impending financial implosion might trigger an economic meltdown.
another, the question will lure speculators, once again emerging

Fourth, the

pen

in

most watched, and

China? Despite

rate of 8 percent for

trigger a

new

its

from

One way

or

their safe havens.

open to scrutiny: What will hapwould meet the targeted growth
devaluation of the yuan, which would

befittingly the least

continued insistence that

both 1998 and 1999 and that

it

financial panic in East Asia, is out of the question, all indicators point to a

severe economic slowdown.

A

growth

even 4 percent

rate of

this

year or next would, in

China's circumstances, amount to a recession, given that every percentage point drop in

GDP

means 5 million more unemployed,

that

some

reliable estimates already predict

18 to 20 million unemployed within a year, a recipe for political unrest. 16 In addition,
there are signs that China's financial institutions are

banks are burdened with bad debts, both

made

during the

boom

becoming a little unstuck. China's
and to property speculators,

to state enterprises

days of the early 1990s.

Many

state enterprises are

bankrupt and face closure, unpalatable though that course of action

A

devaluation of the Chinese yuan or the

Hong Kong

dollar

is

themselves

to the Chinese.

17

would devastate Asian

markets, crushing their efforts to pick themselves up following the East Asian debacle,

send the usual "shock waves" through the developed world, harden predictions of a
global recession to the point where the near certainty attached to the predictions create
situations in
crisis

which the predictions become inevitable

certainties,

and lead

to a global

of liquidity. In these circumstances, or even less consequential ones, as the bite of

economic slowdown begins to clench its teeth on the West's economies, developed
countries will do what is best for themselves
the resuscitation of foreign markets

—

absorb their exports and cushion unemployment will be the

10

first

to

order of business, and

hence an even more ambitious emphasis on pulling Asia,

in particular,

and the more

important emerging markets in the Americas out of their quagmires.

In the face of

overwhelming poverty, exacerbated by AIDS,

the devastation of

endemic

wars, dysfunctional education, the virtual nonexistence of electricity, sanitation, and

owes
which amounts to about $600 for each
person on the continent. Of the forty-one most heavily indebted low-income countries
in the world, no fewer than thirty-four are in sub-Sahara Africa.
In 1996, the World Bank and the IMF announced a plan to reduce the debt burdens
of the world's poorest countries. Two years later, a confidential report to the World
Bank's executive board said that "considerable progress had been made." 18 One shudclean water, rudimentary and unhygienic health care, recurrent famine, Africa

some $227

billion to international creditors,

ders to think
tries,

what the World Bank might construe as lack of progress. Some

forty coun-

again mostly in Africa, were sufficiently poor and indebted to qualify for assis-

Of those, ten have had their cases reviewed, and
Burkina Faso, Cote d'lvoire, and Mozambique
which were African
have been promised help.
Only one, Uganda, has had any debt forgiven. And only a handful more will qualify
for aid before the end of the century, despite the bank's having agreed to relax its restrictions at the September 8 meeting to enable countries which had put economic reform programs in place by 2000 to become eligible for assistance, thus opening the
tance under the 1996 debt-relief plan.
six,

—

—

three of

door for war- torn countries such as Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, and
Sudan. However, even with the relaxed restrictions in place, and assuming that
relief conditions are

any

relief

met

— a big assumption, only a handful of countries

all

debt-

will receive

by the end of the century. 19

One reason is that debt relief raises the cost to creditor governments, and about half
owed to rich-country governments which also pick up much of the outstanding debts
of multilateral institutions that lack the resources to do so themselves. The cost to creditor countries would become much greater if the pool of countries eligible for benefits is
is

further increased.

Moreover, with large and economically important areas slowly succumbing to the
impact of the global financial

way through
Adding

crisis,

the effects of

which may take two years to work
become more circumspect.

its

the global market, developed countries have

to the caution

and uncertainty

is

the

huge cost of financing the bailout of Brazil,
meet its obligations under the

the increasing uncertainty regarding Brazil's capacity to
bailout, continuing

looming

crisis in

economic and

political instability,

which can only worsen, and

the

China.

Unfortunately, the less developed emerging markets or the undeveloped markets of
the rest of the world, the world of the chronically poor and for the
will not

be part of recovery programs, because not having had

is little to

recover, and there

billion dollars spent

on debt

is

most part

much

to

forgotten,

begin with, there

no comparison between the short-term return on one

relief or

one

billion dollars spent in bailing out the

markets

that count.

This leaves South Africa, for example, in a no-man's-land.
but one that has not lived up to
cially as

it

its

potential and

shows

little

An emerging

market, yes,

signs of doing so, espe-

has to contend with recession in an election year in which the election

11

New England Journal

results will

of Public Policy

be more pivotal than the elections

in

1994 since they will point

tion of South Africa's future well into the twenty-first century.

market surrounded by some of the poorest countries

number of cases,

a

tain, or in

seems unable
donor countries to abandon
the continent

enrichment of

relief is the

In

How Africa Was
Ewang

Dr. Peter

to stem,

world, hostage to the uncer-

many,

to the

endemic

strife that

and with a culture of corruption that has led many

when

their efforts to help

the only real tangible results of

and the further impoverishment of the masses.

elites

Brought Low, an essay

for the African

Renaissance Conference,

writes:

and multilateral organizations have made certain policy interventions as a

Bilateral

However, these

direct precondition for loan effectiveness.

that in African countries the constraints for

economic

factors but

and health

tion,

in the

the absence of a future in

to the direc-

But also an emerging

Most of

by

activities ignore the fact

development are not caused solely by

weakness, low-level social awareness, educa-

institutional

care.

the time the constraints have been ignored.

Nowadays

decisions are

dominated by or influenced by international organizations with very limited techniand socio-cultural expertise and insight concerning African countries. Development is something that means something distinctly different to those being developed and those doing the developing. The economic structure of African countries

cal

has been developed not to feed their

development

that

in

need of a renaissance.

in

most of the African

There

is

ample evidence

as aid through

of recurring famine, unpayable debts, and

development programmes have failed

that international

1980 Africa has received billions of dollars

countries. Since

people.

largest recipients of the

It is

USA

no coincidence

that

less

food and

over the past decades, some of the

and the former Soviet Union's aid

Africa, particularly Sudan, Ethiopia,

nations

people but to meet the import needs of

site

development programmes, yet Africa today produces

more hungry

has

own

have made Africa a

in

Sub-Sahara

Mozambique, Somalia, and Angola, have been

where war, famine, and hunger

most common.

are

At best the aid programmes of the past were not

effective, at worst they

been part of the problem. Development has often helped destroy people's

have

ability to

feed themselves. Offers of food pour in but obtaining financial resources for rehabilitation is usually difficult.

Dumping food

as relief has not solved the develop-

mental problems of Africa. Food aid extended by developed countries, following
devastating famines caused by civil strife and natural calamities, has adversely
affected the capacity of the continent to deal with

programmes have introduced a harmful

spirit

its

problems. Generally food aid

of submissiveness and dependency

poor societies and inefficiency and corruption into governments of most

into these

of these countries.

The hunger and debt caused by
ments
into

in

the

huge debts are

difficult to accept.

Sub-Sahara Africa have been pressured by the

implementing

programmes

structural adjustment

development. These countries are made

to

pay

IMF

Govern-

and the World Bank

in order to acquire loans for

their debts

by surrendering the bulk

of their export earnings, leasing out valuable resources at throwaway prices to earn
extra income, and sacrificing social and environmental considerations to earn

enough

to

Many

pay

their debts.

countries in Sub-Sahara Africa

owe more money today

than they did ten

or twenty years ago. In fact, in 1992 African external debt had reached

$290

billion,

about 2.4 times greater than in 1980. In the Sub-Saharan African countries alone the
debt increased from $6 billion in 1970 to $243 billion in 1994. The big question

why

is

the big institutions (the World Bank, IMF, and others) let this unbearable debt

accrue.

20
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That such an essay should be one of the showcase features introducing the conference

cause for reflection. The insinuation

is

is

dered Africa in the past but continue to do so

which although ostensibly tailored

to the

that

developed countries not only plun-

in the guise

of development programs,

needs of the country

question are in effect

in

instruments of measured interference, designed to service the needs of the developed

Even humanitarian

countries.
light.

For every dollar given

aid

— food

to alleviate

economies of the poorer countries according

the

famine

in aid, there is a condition, an

—

is

viewed

in a sinister

unspoken agenda

to

mold

to the dictates and, needless to say,

advantage of the donor country.

The essay

an expression of anger

is

at

developed countries:

"we-

at their hubris, their

know-it-all" attitude; their condescension inherited from the lingering sense of conquest

and the unstated but

were better

silently held conviction that things

deed, even today, and perhaps to a greater degree in the post-Cold

powers vie with one another

colonial

Africa, and

when

for "parental" control over

sort things out, all

under the pretense of having

be "their"

to

some

his

would-be usurper of

tin-pot dictator or the

who

to "protect" their citizens
is

are

still

being scorched in the interests of

much coveted

position. It is a mani-

deep resentment of the developed countries' self-perceived sense of going

way

out of the

former

era,

what used

the children are naughty, they are not above sending in their troops to

residents of whatever godforsaken piece of earth

festation of

in "their" day. In-

War

to help, at the altruism they

more

only makes recipients

smother themselves

in,

when

the help really

roiled that they have to turn to their former "masters" or

clones of their erstwhile masters for help in the

first

place; bitterness that the help en-

courages a culture of helplessness, thus fostering the dependency the help

supposed

is

to eradicate.
It is

noteworthy, too, for what

of the continent
that

famine

is

embroiled in

it

way

its

Given

that

into the

many

hands of the warmongers; that corruption

little

refugees

in

who

is

pervasive.

borders arbitrarily drawn by

regard to natural alignments, ethnic demarcations, or

that natural disasters

have taken an inordinate

are permanently homeless

permanent source of

of others;

used as a weapon to leverage con-

and that fears of domination by one ethnic group, often

from the surface,
create a

is

swaths

in large

often withheld from the starving and mysteriously

is

of Africa's conflicts have their roots

conquering powers with
history,

That every other country

often self-induced; that food relief

is

cessions from the enemy; that food
finds

fails to say.

civil conflict or party to the civil conflicts

never far

justified, are
toll,

that the 12 million

— and countryless — have nowhere

instability in the region,

and

to

go and

that indebtedness cripples the

prospects for development, one can easily empathize with the rage of Africa.

But the

failure of

Ewang

to

acknowledge

may have anything to do with
who stoked ethnic anambition, of those who looted

that Africans

the plight they are in, that the actions of their elites or of those

tagonisms and fanned the flames of hatred for personal
their countries of their

exploited their

wealth on a scale almost unimaginable to imagine,

own people

could match, to

fail to

hold Africa accountable for many of the

sink into the self-pity that

who

have

to a degree that not even the colonial imperialists of the past

is

ills

that beset

it is

to

the hallmark of the submissiveness and dependency he

goes to such great lengths to warn against.

Commenting on

the renaissance conference,

conflicts plaguing Africa did not

four countries in Africa

Thabo Kobokoane observed

dominate the proceedings."

was engaged

in conflict; half the

Africa.)

13

that "the

(In the past year,

one of

worldwide deaths occurred

in

New England Journal

of Public Policy

Surely discussion on these wars and rebellions should have been at the centre of any

debate about a reawakening Africa? After

problems that
to those

who

fly in the face

all, it is

the continent's all-too-familiar

of a so-called renaissance; a massive stumbling block

will eventually oversee its regeneration.

Yet to the bulk of African Renaissance delegates, the festering conflicts did not

appear important. [An equally] pressing question that needed addressing concerned
the nature of Africa's governments.

an essentially private-driven
of

civil society?

How

will the African renaissance

initiative, relate to

"movement,"

those states that have no tolerance

21

VI
The Gini

coefficient

On

society.

equality,

is

the standard tool for measuring the degree of inequality in a

a scale of

to

1

,

where

represents absolute equality and

absolute in-

1

South Africa currently ranks second in the world in terms of income inequality

with a coefficient of 0.58; only Brazil, with a coefficient of 0.63, ranks worse. According to one argument, countries in the throes of development should undergo an increase
in levels

of income inequality, since growth by

hence the inequities to which

it

process in which the variables that drive

it

— important components of growth such
sectors of the

economy

to the

its

very nature

is

an uneven process, and

gives rise are a function of growth itself

— a dynamic

are themselves changing at differential rates

as the

more productive,

movement of

labor from less productive

patterns of migration

from

rural areas to

urban areas, the distribution of capital with a preponderance going to capital-intensive
industries, the

unequal rates of technological change, the gestation of "new" industries,

ensure that inequalities increase as society

all

is in

ing economies

— Chile

closer to South Africa,
scale, countries

(0.56), Panama (0.57), Thailand (0.46), Malaysia (0.56), and
Zimbabwe (0.57) and Kenya (0.58). On the other end of the

with the highest degrees of inequality tend to be the poorest countries,

trapped in unbreakable chains of pervasive poverty
(0.29),
is

a perpetual state of transformation.

not unsurprising therefore that Gini coefficients tend to be highest in the emerg-

It is

and Laos

(0.30).

22

The

capitalist

nothing more than growth in progress." 23

greater the degree of inequality, the

— Bangladesh

view: "inequality, despite

Which would appear

more growth

in progress,

(0.28),
its

Rwanda

perceived inequity,

to suggest that the

and

that if

we

value

we should be prepared to tolerate the inequalities it breeds.
The transfer of technology may also increase inequality. Although some innovations
benefit the worst off, much technological progress raises the marginal products of those
who are already more productive. Even when it does not, the opportunity cost of public
investment in technology might be forgone investment in antipoverty programs. By
increasing output, however, these investments can benefit the entire society. The potengrowth,

tial

trickle

down, however,

is

not necessarily rapid or comprehensive. 24

VII

If the

white view of inequality

is that

white affluence relative to blacks

able to white exploitation of blacks,

is

not attribut-

which has contributed to the relative and absolute
poverty of blacks, then South African Deputy President Thabo Mbeki's argument that
there are two nations in South Africa
one white and well off, the other black and
poor
is lost on whites and one more instance of the refusal on the part of whites to

—

—

14

acknowledge the damage

that apartheid did, especially in confining the education of

blacks to a level that ensured that they could not rise above a certain functional level

—

of serving as the human fuel for the white industrial machines and as the underground
excavators of the mineral wealth that enriched the white fraternity. If whites cannot

bring themselves to see

— and acknowledge —

and especially under apartheid, then the future
an increasingly resentful black

—

most

people

such

elite will

redistribution through taxation.

who

silent

that they exploited blacks in the past,

for

improved race

relations

is

bleak, and

seek retribution through the means whites fear

How

can one speak of nation building when the

engage each other with

are supposedly the rudimentary core of the nation

enmity?

VIII
In the United States, unchallenged in

man, Alan Greenspan's decisions

its

role as the global

economy's

reflect U.S. interests, in this case

financial police-

how

best to balance

most concern to
home which would

the country's vulnerability to deflation in markets that are of
destinations for

its

exports against the risks of inflation at

from increasing the money supply, thereby triggering a reduction

was

universally agreed

world

—

as if universal

which the capacity

in

to

it,

in interest rates.

agreement on anything counts

for

much

produce instantaneous information on any issue

point far outweighs the capacity of

its

recipients to assimilate

it

that are

result

—

that the

at

It

in

a

any

concomitant

domino effects which would follow a cut in interests rates in the United States would
save many countries from free fall into recession.
What kind of New World Order are we building when the economic fate of the struggling countries that account for the overwhelming proportion of the world's population
lies in the hands of a reserve bank that makes its decisions on rates reduction on the
basis of what's best for the United States, not on the basis of what is best for the world
economy, on the basis of how deflation in many parts of the world would impinge on
American interests and open the economy to possible exposure to the deflation virus, on
the basis of what's good for America is good for the rest of the world, an indicator of
the hubris of a country which has had to suffer the least, and whose response to addressing the increasing disparities in world inequities

of

GDP

it

is to

cut the relatively small percentage

contributes in aid to distressed nations struggling to

oppression and exploitation.

(It

already contributes the least

emerge from centuries of

—

at 0. 1

1

percent of

GDP.

compared with what other developed and the upper tier
of developing countries contribute, and it has steadfastly refused to pay its arrears to the

it

ranks at the bottom of the

list

United Nations.) 25

To

talk

of the need to build multiparty democracies in such circumstances or to go

on millimeter-measuring exercises to determine whether a country

is

slipping

from

being a one-party dominant state to a one-party state would be farcical were they not so
pervasively practiced by the savants of the United States' perceived national interest.

(Former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski,
allies

that

who

refers to America's

and friends as "vassals and tributaries," argues the case for a grand geostrategy

would "prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals,
tributaries pliant and protected, and keep the barbarians from coming to-

keep the
gether."

26

And David

Rothkopf, a former senior

in a burst of moral fervor

and

patriotic humility

should not deny the fact that of

all

member of the Clinton administration,
was moved to write that "Americans

the nations in the world, theirs

75

is

the

most just and

New England Journal of Public Policy

the best
still

has

model

for the future."

27

adherents; history,

its

it

The proposition that we have reached the end of history
seems, is somehow synonymous with the American

destiny.)

Indeed,

when Greenspan made

acknowledgment before the U.S.

the "by-the-way"

Senate on September 22, 1998, that Reserve Bank policymakers were fully aware of the

widening financial

crisis that

economy

pact on the U.S.

had spread from Asia

to the rest of the

world and

its

im-

("Deteriorating foreign economies and their spillover to do-

mestic markets have increased the possibility that the slowdown in the growth of the

American economy

will

be more than sufficient

analysts profoundly proclaimed that this

would

was

to

markets soared, and some of the capital that had
in search of safer or

more

Greenspan

the clearest indication yet that

by lowering U.S. interest

fight the prospect of a spreading recession

emerging markets

hold inflation in check"), 28 financial

fled

some of

more

the

rates.

Asian

sophisticated

lucrative rewards returned to local bourses.

In South Africa, the rand recovered to close the day's trading at R5.8 to the dollar

R6.00

the "symbolic"
that followed

many market

that not too long
to

in the

—

euphoria

analysts predicted a quick recovery, overlooking the fact

ago an exchange

develop a severe case of the

R5.00

rate of

to the dollar

was cause

for the

market

jitters.

when Greenspan

In the event,

benchmark had been breached, and

to the dollar

did

make

"momentous"

his

decision, he cut the Re-

serve Bank's prime rate 0.25 percent, well below anticipation and already well dis-

counted

markets. The result: "An

in the

immense cloud of despondency hung over

markets as the Johannesburg Stock Exchange
cent tumble

.

.

.

R6

through the

and the rand once again
barrier."

What annoyed,

29

So much

slid relentlessly against the dollar,

for euphoria

frustrated, indeed

local

share index took a further 3.337 per-

all

and

its

breaking

afterglow.

angered other countries, especially the emerging

markets, was Greenspan's seeming myopia or indifference, or worse, ignorance regarding what

was happening

in the

world around him.

Greenspan's second intervention

in the

market

in

October,

when he unexpectedly

cut

short-term interest rates by another quarter of a percent, the second such cut in the

space of sixteen days, had at least the salutary benefit of being unanticipated. Its impact
was not prematurely discounted in the markets and therefore was a more effective
booster to market indexes, bringing with
that the worst
full

was behind

us,

it

the usual clamor of the collective pundits

and "recovery"

— How can one of recovery when the
— was on the way. Besides,
talk

extent of the illness has not yet been fully diagnosed?

when a person of Greenspan's preeminence

is

so unnerved by market developments that

he finds himself publicly admitting that "I've never seen anything like

— gobble — humble
breath — and

oracle himself starts to eat

where

to hold their

Britain, Spain,

pie,

it

this,"

when

the

behooves policymakers every-

their appetite. Interest rate cuts in other countries

Canada, China, Japan, and Ireland

forestall global recession.

— provided a

But Germany continued

—

floor to cushion or

to resist a cut, creating sufficient

uncertainty to keep the edge of volatility in the ascendant.

Greenspan's surprising remark

had been so apparent
mist Lester
Fear

Thurow

is

rising

I

find

Why had he been blind to what
some time? Some months ago econo-

precisely the issue.

world

for

wrote,

and so

is

anger

and economic conferences
weeks,

is

to the rest of the

at

do-nothing Americans

in Latin

enormous anger

.

.

.

Having been

America, Asia, and Europe

at the entire

United States. The

16

at financial

in the past

rest

few

of the world

enormous economic hurricane

believes that an

is

building up

the captain of the ship, the ship's senior officers, and those
aren't paying attention to the dangers that are developing

.

.

its

strength and that

who

ride in first class

.

They

feel

we

are just

not focused on the dangers that are about to strike inland and lay waste the global

economy. 30
is why Alan Greenspan's first quarter of a percentage point cut in
was greeted so negatively in the world capital markets, and why he had to
make an emergency second cut just two weeks later, and why he had to promise that he
was thinking of yet a third cut in the not-too-distant future.
To the rest of the world, that trivial first cut first looked as though Greenspan did not
know what was going on. The economic hurricane was about to arrive, and he, as the
leader of the world's central bank of last resort, was not willing to signal with a big
interest rate cut that, if necessary, he would provide the world with the liquidity the
world's markets needed to avoid a disaster. He did not seem to understand that issues
are no longer those of fine-tuning inflation but avoiding a global meltdown.

This, of course,

interest rates

Thurow concludes,

When

fear takes over in the financial markets, they

apart very rapidly. Fears are

fall

now growing like mushrooms. How big will the {worldwide] bank losses be? How
many more huge losses like those at Long-term Capital Investment will suddenly
appear? How many more countries like Russia and Malaysia are simply going to let
their

companies

violate [the pledges] they have signed

and not force them

to

repay

What happens if the stock market goes down and Americans begin
back on their spending? What happens if Japan fails to continue to deal with

legitimate debts?
to cut
its

problems? Rational or

And imagine
The

the fear

if

irrational, fear is clearly

Brazil's

signs that something

much

on the

rise.

31

touted bailout becomes seriously derailed.

make

clearly out of kilter are everywhere. Policymakers

is

statements as though hermetically sealed from each other. In the world's respected
financial organs legends like

the woods,"

34

"US

recurrence of the recent financial

"Global bulls suffer

crisis

crisis,"

35

at the centre

"Turmoil

hits

US consumer

"Ominous symptoms of recession

33

"A world

in

confidence," 36

"US consumers

are apparent,"

below zero," 41 "Chancellor paints gloomy world

fall to

crisis,"

of the G7's plan to prevent

of confidence," 37 "Russia's bleak future," 38

score negative savings rates," 39
depositrates

begins to catch a cold," 32 "China

"currency vacuum: gaping hole

picture,"

42

40

"Yen

and on

same page of The New York Times, "Greenspan Sees Calming of Markets" and
"Growth in Jobs Slowed Sharply Last Month," 43 "Chinese Investment Trust Defaults on
the

Bond Payments,
helter-skelter
that

"God's

Stirring Fear;"

44

"Fears over Brazil roll-over," 45 follow each other

and the United States continues

in his

Globalization

heaven

—

here to stay,

is

Summit. The

crisis

own making;

rather

its

roller-coaster ride

Thabo Mbeki somberly informed

South Africa faced, indeed that they
it

was a case of

In
at the

October 1998, the

do

not."

glitterati

were

Mbeki concluded,

influence markets lies exclusively in the hands of those
collectively,

all

Non-Aligned

the

facing,

was not of

their

their being caught in the fallout following the col-

lapse of the Asian markets. "The stark reality,"

which we, even

on the markets, sure

All's right with the world."

"is that the

who dominate

power

to

those markets,

46

of the financial world gathered in Washington, D.C.,

annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to dis-

cuss what was

now

world economy in

being routinely described as the worst financial

fifty years.

What

lent gravitas to the

17

crisis to

occasion was

engulf the

the fact that the

New England Journal

crisis they

of Public Policy

had gathered

was never supposed

to discuss

to

happen. Hadn't the integration

of global capital markets, the sophistication of the instruments that allowed for risk

management, disclosure requirements,

diversification
sion, the

financial regulation

and supervi-

omnipresence of rating agencies, the plethora of complex risk models,

real-

time transactions, and instantaneous communications prevented the kind of collapse
that

was gathering speed

pondered the question: What had gone wrong?

as they

Great minds knitted their brows and looked for fairy-tale remedies. But there were
none. In symposiums, workshops, plenary sessions, and one-on-ones, the mighty and

wisdom to unraveling the
was causing financial gyrations in world markets and threatening
economic chaos. It was if the free market had gotten away from them, had discovered
that its power was unbounded, that the unfettered movement of rapacious capital, as it
the not-so-mighty clustered together, applying their collective

monetary mess

that

zigzagged from market to market and from markets to havens of

whole economies, yet find
starts for the

its

appetite

still

shelter,

could devour

insatiable, searching in apoplectic fits

"This year, as currencies and bourses have crashed and people in the more

economies have taken

to the streets," writes Paul Bell, "the

dulum of political economics has begun
scriptions of the
that

and

carcasses of other bankrupt countries.

Thatcher/Reagan

to

damaged

moral and theoretical pen-

swing away from the neo-liberalism pre-

and back toward the social democratic construct

era,

was displaced by Thatcherism and

is

being reasserted

now under

a

new neo-

Keynesian rubric of 'people- centered' development." 47
In

Asia

state driven capitalism

reduction. But the crisis

year ago

myth of
year,

discovered

is

their success.

who

first

now

exposed

to

to other emerging economies
model of rapid growth and poverty

had long been held up

(not least South Africa) as the best available
in the

world

in

Thailand and South Korea a

be long in the making as was the mythology of the

While the Asian economies were growing

at

6-8 percent a

cared that the chaebols were overprotected, or cronies overrewarded, or

financial institutions

under regulated and increasingly reliant on short-term invest-

ment, or profits directed away from

R&D

into the overheated property markets of

those countries?48

Part

Two

In Helsinki, Finland,

on January

7,

1998, Joseph Stiglitz, senior vice president and chief

economist of the World Bank, delivered the 1998

WIDER Annual

Lecture,

More

Instru-

ments and Broader Goals: Moving Toward the Post-Washington Consensus. This was, of
course,

months before the

devaluations in
felt,

its

full

dimensions of the Asian

wake, before the

full

crisis

had brought a wave of

impact of "Asian contagion" had made

before the collapse of the Japanese banking system, before

into free

fall,

their

economies

littered

In the course of his remarks,

were, into

"new world

many

itself

currencies went

with the detritus of economic collapse.

he offered the following "world view," a glance, as

thinking," or a thinking

man's guide

to

how

to put the

it

brakes on

a free-market capitalism about to go berserk, an ax murderer abroad in a kindergarten.

His thoughts:

•

The Washington consensus held that good economic performance
required liberalized trade, macroeconomic stability, and getting prices
right. Once the government dealt with these issues
essentially, once

—

18

the

government "got out of the way"

— private markets would allocate

resources efficiently and generate robust growth. But the policies

advanced by the Washington consensus were not complete, and they
were sometimes misguided.

An admission that the mandarins of Washington,
A dent in the aura of infallibility?
•

D.C., might on occasion screw

Making markets work requires more than
inter alia,

just

low

inflation;

it

it

up?

requires,

sound financial regulation, competition policy, and policies

to facilitate the transfer of technology and to encourage transparency.
The Bank's understanding of the instruments to promote well-functioning markets had improved. They had broadened the objectives of
development to include other goals, such as sustainable development,
egalitarian development, and democratic development.
What, might we timidly ask, did the Bank consider to be the "objectives of development" before lightning struck on the road to Damascus?
•

•

Since the financial crisis the East Asian economies had been widely

condemned

for their

misguided economic policies, which were seen as

responsible for the mess in which those economies found themselves.

Some ideologues had

taken advantage of the current problems in East

Asia to suggest that the system of active state intervention

is

the root of

They kept pointing to the government-directed loans and
the cozy relations between the government and the large chaebol in the
the problem.

Republic of Korea. In doing so, they overlooked the successes of the
past three decades, to

which the government, despite occasional

mistakes, had certainly contributed. These achievements, which in-

cluded not only large increases in per capita
life

GDP

but also increases in

expectancy, the extension of education, and a dramatic reduction in

poverty,

were

real

and would prove more lasting than the current

financial turmoil.

And

was only January 1998. What would these "ideologues" be saying in Januaryand the chaebols remained as resistant to restructuring as they did a year ago?
this

1999, as the Republic of Korea remained mired in recession,

•

The heart of the current problem, at least in East Asia, in most cases is
not that government has done too much in every area but that it has
done too little in some areas. In Thailand the problem was not that the
government directed investments into real estate; it was that government
regulators failed to halt it. Similarly, the Republic of Korea suffered
from problems including overlending to companies with excessively
high leverage and weak corporate governance. The fault is not that the
government misdirected credit
the fact that the current turmoil was
precipitated by loans by so many U.S., European, and Japanese banks

—

may have seriously misdirected credit.
problem was the government's lack of action, the fact that
the government underestimated the importance of financial regulation
and corporate governance.
suggests that market entities also

Instead, the
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The current crisis in East Asia is not a refutation of the East Asian
miracle. The basic facts remain: no other region in the world has ever
had incomes rise so dramatically and seen so many people move out of
poverty in such a short time.

•

East Asian governments, for instance, were running budget surpluses;
inflation

was low and, before the devaluations, was

falling.

The origins

of the current financial crises lay elsewhere and their solutions would

not be found in the Washington consensus.
•

The focus on

had detracted attention from other major sources
weak financial sectors. In focusing on
trade liberalization, deregulation, and privatization, policymakers
ignored other important ingredients, most notably competition, that are
inflation

of macroinstability, namely,

required to

make an

effective

market economy and which may be at
economic prescriptions in determin-

least as important as the standard

•

•

ing long-term economic success.
Other essential ingredients were also

left out or underemphasized by the
Washington consensus. One, education, had been widely recognized
within the development community; another, improvement of technology, had not received the attention it deserved.
The success of the Washington consensus as an intellectual doctrine
rested on its simplicity: its policy recommendations could be administered by economists using little more than simple accounting frameworks. A few economic indicators
inflation, money supply growth,
interest rates, budget and trade deficits
could serve as the basis for a
set of policy recommendations. Indeed, in some cases economists
would fly into a country, look at and attempt to verify these data, and
make macroeconomic recommendations for policy reforms all in the

—

—

space of a couple of weeks.

Who
•

are these people??

There are no easy-to-read thermometers of the economy's health, and
worse still, there may be trade-offs in which economists, especially
outside economists, should limit their role to describing consequences

of alternative policies.

The

political process

may

actually have an

important say in the choices of economic direction. Economic policy

may not be just a matter for technical experts!
Poor nations have to put up with the clap-trap of these "outside" economists for decades, and worse yet, have had to eat their words, even when the words stuck in the
craw.

•

The Washington consensus's messages in two core areas are at best
incomplete and at worst misguided. While macrostability is important,
for example, inflation

is not always its most essential component. Trade
and privatization are key parts of sound macroeconomic
policies, but they are not ends in themselves. They are means to the end

liberalization

How

of a less distorted, more competitive, more efficient marketplace and
must be complemented by effective regulation and competition policies.
many countries in Africa, and underdeveloped parts of the Americas and Asia,
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have suffered the consequences of such insufferable hubris and found themselves endlessly at the short end of the IMF stick? And for what?
•

Controlling inflation. Probably the most important policy prescription

of the stabilization packages promoted by the Washington consensus

was controlling

inflation.

strikes against inflation is

mental

is

lowered.

The argument

for aggressive,

preemptive

based on three premises. The most funda-

that inflation is costly

The second premise

is

and should therefore be averted or
once inflation starts to rise it has a

that

tendency to accelerate out of control. This belief provides a strong
motivation for preemptive strikes against inflation, with the risk of an
increase in inflation being weighed far

more heavily than

the risk of

adverse effects on output and unemployment. The third premise

is that

increases in inflation are very costly to reverse. This line of thought

implies that even

if

maintaining low unemployment were valued more

highly than maintaining low inflation, steps would
inflation

from increasing today

in order to avoid

recessions to bring the inflation rate

down

still

be taken

to

keep

having to induce large

later on. All three

of these

premises can be tested empirically.
•

The evidence has shown only that high inflation is costly. When countries cross the threshold of 40 percent annual inflation, they fall into a
high-inflation/low-growth trap. Below that level, however, there is little
evidence that inflation is costly. High inflation is, on average, deleterious for growth. Recent research suggests that low levels of inflation
may even improve economic performance relative to what it would have
been with zero inflation. Controlling high- and medium-rate inflation
should be a fundamental policy priority, but pushing low inflation even

lower is not likely to significantly improve the functioning of markets.
What false gods have we been serving? And for whom?
•

In 1995,

more than half

the countries in the developing world

inflation rates of less than 15 percent a year.

had

For these seventy-one

countries controlling inflation should not be an overarching priority.

Controlling inflation

is

probably an important component of stabiliza-

tion and reform in the twenty-five countries, almost all of

them

in

Africa, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, with inflation
rates of

inflation

more than 40 percent

may

The single-minded focus on

a year.

not only distort economic policies, preventing the

economy from

living

up

to its full

growth and output potentials, but
economic flexibility

also lead to institutional arrangements that reduce

without gaining important growth benefits.
Yet,

why

this fixation with inflation?

developing countries, but
trotted out by bankers

•

in the

Why does

it

not drive the engine of policy

developed ones? Has

it

become an

in the

election mantra,

and businesspeople who know better?

Managing the budget deficit and the current account deficit. A second
component of macroeconomic stability has been reducing the size of
government, the budget

deficit,

and the current account
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deficit.

Much

New England Journal

•

of Public Policy

evidence shows that sustained, large-budget deficits are deleterious to
economic performance.
There is no simple formula for determining the optimum level of the
budget deficit. The optimum deficit, or the range of sustainable deficits,
depends on circumstances, including the cyclical state of the economy,
prospects for future growth, the uses of government spending, the depth
of financial markets, and the levels of national savings and national

investment.

So much for
•

all those writ-in-stone

The optimal

deficit-to-GDP

ratios.

level of the current account deficit

when

is

difficult to determine.

more than it
good nor inherently bad but depend,
on circumstances and especially on the uses to which the funds are put.

Current account deficits occur
saves.

In

They

many

a country invests

are neither inherently

countries the rate of return on investment far exceeds the cost

of international capital. In these circumstances current account deficits
are sustainable.
•

The form of

the financing deficits matters.

but also the fact that

it

The advantage of

and knowledge

direct investment is not just the capital

that

foreign

it

supplies,

tends to be very stable. In contrast, Thailand's 8

percent current account deficit in 1996 was not only large but came in
the

form of short-term, dollar-denominated debt

that

was used

to

finance local-currency-denominated investment, often in excessive and

unproductive uses like real estate.

More

generally, short-term debt and

portfolio flows can bring the costs of high volatility without the benefits
•

of knowledge spillovers.

and promoting long-run growth. Ironically, macroeconomic stability, as conceived by the Washington consensus, typically downplays stabilizing output or unemployment. Minimizing or
avoiding major economic contractions should be one of the most
Stabilizing output

important goals of policy. In the short run, large-scale involuntary

unemployment-is clearly inefficient

—

in purely

represents idle resources that could be used

more

economic terms it
productively. The

social and economic costs of these downturns can be devastating: lives
and families are disrupted, poverty increases, living standards decline,
and, in the worst cases, social and economic costs translate into political and social turmoil.
If 40 percent

of the employable population is unemployed and another 20 percent underemployed, what impact does a "downturn" have on their lives? It's not the
economy, stupid,

it's

jobs, jobs,

and more jobs

country 's being. Poor countries don
•

't

until they ooze out of every pore of the
have financial sectors, but they do have people.

A

growing literature, both theoretical and empirical, has emphasized the
important microeconomic underpinnings of macroeconomic stability.
This literature emphasizes the importance of financial markets and
explains economic downturns through such mechanisms as credit
rationing and banking and firm failures.
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In the nineteenth century,
tries resulted

most of the major economic downturns

to precipitous declines in asset
tries

improvement

in regulation

and the shaping of incentives
ity

in industrial

that

and supervision, the introduction of deposit insurance,

for financial institutions

reduced the incidence and sever-

of financial panics. But financial crises continue to occur, and there

dence

that they

coun-

were sometimes preceded by and invariably led
prices and widespread banking failures. In some coun-

from financial panics

have become more frequent and more severe

is

some eviEven after

in recent years

adjusting for inflation, the losses from the savings and loan debacle in the United States

were

several times larger than the losses experienced in the Great Depression. Yet

measured

relative to

GDP,

this

debacle would not

make

the

list

international banking crises since the early 1980s.

•

Banking crises have severe macroeconomic consequences, affecting
growth over the five following years. During the period 1975-1994,

growth edged up slightly in countries that did not experience banking
crises; countries

with banking crises saw growth slow by 1.3 percentage

points in the five years following a crisis. Clearly, building robust
financial

systems

is

a crucial part of promoting

macroeconomic

stabil-

ity.

•

The importance of building robust financial systems goes beyond
simply averting economic crises. The financial system can be likened to
the "brain" of the

economy. Financial markets serve a number of other

functions, including reducing risk, increasing liquidity, and conveying

information. All these functions are essential to both the growth of
capital
•

and the increase

in total factor productivity.

Left to themselves, financial systems will not

do a very good job of

performing these functions.
•

The emphasis on "transparency"

in recent discussions of East

Asia

demonstrates the growing recognition of the importance of good
information for the effective functioning of markets. Capital markets, in
particular, require auditing standards

accompanied by

effective legal

systems to discourage fraud, provide investors with adequate informa-

and liabilities, and protect minority shareBut transparency by itself is not sufficient, in part because
information is inevitably imperfect. A sound legal framework combined
with regulation and oversight is necessary to mitigate these informational problems and foster the conditions for efficient financial markets.
tion about the firms' assets

holders.

•

Regulation serves four purposes in successful financial markets:

maintaining safety and soundness (prudential regulation), promoting
competition, protecting consumers, and ensuring that underserved

groups have some access to capital. In

many

cases the pursuit of social

and poor communities
receive funds, as the United States' Community Reinvestment Act does,
or ensuring funds for mortgages, the essential mission of the government-created Federal National Mortgage Association, can, if done well,
reinforce economic objectives. Similarly, protecting consumers is not
only good social policy, it also builds confidence that there is a "level
playing field" in economic markets. Without such confidence those
objectives, such as ensuring that minorities
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markets will remain thin and ineffective.
The World Bank and others have tried to create better banking systems.

But changing the system through institutional development, transformaand creation of regulatory structures that reduce
the likelihood of excessive risk taking has proved more intractable than
finding short-term solutions such as recapitalizing the banking system.
In the worst cases the temporary fixes may even have undermined
pressures for further reform. Since the fundamental problems were not
addressed, some countries have required assistance again and again.
Translation: The World Bank and other international and supranational financial institutions have been a large part of the problem of the global predicament they now so
grandiosely moralize about. Instead of becoming part of the solution, it was often more
tions in credit culture,

convenient to become part of the problem.
•

The key

issue should not be liberalization or deregulation but construc-

tion of the regulatory

system. In

many

framework

that ensures an effective financial

countries this will require changing the regulatory

framework by eliminating regulations that serve only to restrict compebut accompanying these changes with increased regulations to
ensure competition and prudential behavior (and to ensure that banks
tition

have appropriate incentives).
•

Even when
will

have

the design of the desired financial system

to

be exercised

deregulation, sometimes

in the transition.

known

Attempts

is

in place, care

to initiate

overnight

as the "big bang," ignore the very

sensitive issues of sequencing. Thailand, for instance, used to have
restrictions

tion

it

on bank lending for

real estate. In the process of liberaliza-

got rid of these restrictions without establishing a more sophisti-

The result, together with other
was the large-scale misallocation of capital to fuel a real estate

cated risk-based regulatory regime.
factors,

bubble, an important factor in the financial
•

It is

important to recognize

how

difficult

crisis.

it is

to establish a vibrant

Even economies with sophisticated institutions, high
levels of transparency, and good corporate governance like the United
States and Sweden have faced serious problems with their financial
sectors. The challenges facing developing countries are far greater,
financial sector.

•

while the institutional base from which they start is far weaker.
Without the appropriate legal framework, securities markets can simply
fail to perform their vital functions to the detriment of a country's longterm economic growth. Laws are required to protect the interests of
shareholders, especially minority shareholders.

•

The focus on the microeconomic, particularly the financial, underpinnings of the macroeconomy also has implications for responses to
currency turmoil. In particular, where currency turmoil is the consequence of a failing financial sector, the conventional policy response to

may be counterproductive. Interest rate increases
can lead to substantial reductions in bank net worth, further exacerbat-

rising interest rates

IMF and World Bank
economists have confirmed that interest rate rises tend to increase the
ing the banking crisis. Empirical studies by
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probability of banking crises and that currency devaluations have no
significant effect.

This will be most reassuring to all those emerging markets, especially the likes of

South Africa, which held their breath while Alan Greenspan held his serve! Not a single

mention of the Federal Reserve Board?
•

Advocates of high-interest-rate policies assert that such policies are
necessary to restore confidence in the economy and thus stop the
erosion of the currency's value. Halting the erosion of the currency, in

both to restore the underlying strength of the

turn, is important

economy and

to

prevent a burst of inflation from the rise of the price of

imported goods. This prescription
reactions

—

that

is,

what

is

based on assumptions about market

will restore confidence

— and economic

fundamentals. Ultimately confidence and economic fundamentals are
inextricably intertwined.

Are measures

that

weaken the economy,

especially the financial system, likely to restore confidence?

South Africa, are you listening?
•

Macroeconomic policy needs

to

be expanded beyond a single-minded

focus on inflation and budget deficits; the set of policies that underlay
the Washington consensus are not sufficient for
ity or long-term development.

Macroeconomic

macroeconomic
stability

stabil-

and long-term

development require sound financial markets. But the agenda for
creating sound financial markets should not confuse means with ends;
redesigning the regulatory system, not financial liberalization, should

be the issue.
•

The fundamental theorems of welfare economics, the results that
establish the efficiency of a market economy, assume that both private
property and competitive markets exist in the economy. Many countries,

especially developing and transition economies, lack both. Until

recently, however,

emphasis was placed almost exclusively on creating

private property and liberalizing trade

— trade liberalization being

confused with establishing competitive markets. Trade liberalization
important, but

we

economy.
monopolies in certain industries have
stifled competition. But the emphasis on privatization over the past
decade has stemmed less from concern over lack of competition than
from a focus on profit incentives. In a sense, it was natural for the
Washington consensus to focus more on privatization than on competition. Not only were state enterprises inefficient, their losses contributed
to the government's budget deficit, adding to macroeconomic instability. Privatization would kill two birds with one stone, simultaneously
improving economic efficiency and reducing fiscal deficits. The idea
was that if property rights could be created, the profit-maximizing
behavior of the owners would eliminate waste and inefficiency. At the
same time the sale of the enterprises would raise much needed revenue.
Although most people would have preferred a more orderly restructuring
trade without creating a competitive

•

•

is

are unlikely to realize the full benefits of liberalizing

Facilitating privatization. State
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and the establishment of an effective legal structure (covering contracts,
bankruptcy, corporate governance, and competition) prior to or

simultaneously with promulgations, no one

window would

stay open.

At the

knew how long

at least

the reform

time, privatizing quickly and compre-

hensively, then fixing the problems later on,

seemed

a reasonable

gamble. From today's vantage point, the advocates of privatization

may

have overestimated the benefits of privatization and underestimated the
costs, particularly the political costs of the process itself and the
impediments it has posed to further reform. Taking that same gamble

more years of experience, would be

today, with the benefit of seven

much
Many

less justified.
in the

supranational financial institutions warned against hastily

privatizing without creating the

needed

institutional infrastructure,

including competitive markets and regulatory bodies.

competition

is

If,

for instance,

monopoly will
consumers. And there is some

lacking, creating a private, unregulated

likely result in even higher prices for

evidence that insulated from competition, private monopolies

may

from several forms of inefficiency and may not be highly innovaIn other words, why push ahead with privatization without promot-

suffer
tive.

ing competition?

—

The Washington consensus is right
privatization is important. The
government needs to devote its scarce resources to areas the private
sector does not and is not likely to enter. It makes no sense for the
government to be running steel mills. But there are critical issues about
both the sequencing and the scope of privatization. Even when
privatization increases productive efficiency,

it

may be

difficult to

ensure that broader public objectives are attained, even with regulation.

Should prisons, social services, or the making of atomic bombs (or the

bombs, highly enriched uranium) be
some in the United States have advocated? Where are the
boundaries? More private-sector activity can be introduced into public
central ingredient of atomic

privatized, as

activities (through contracting, for

mechanisms such

example, and incentive-based

How

mechanisms as
These issues were not addressed
by the Washington consensus. One must balance between the competing
demands of private efficiency and public objectives.
For much of this century people have looked to government to spend
more and intervene more. Government spending as a share of GDP has
grown with these demands. The Washington consensus policies were
based on a rejection of the state's activist role and the promotion of a
as auctions).

effective are such

substitutes for outright privatization?

The unspoken premise is that
governments are worse than markets. Therefore the smaller the state the
minimalist, noninterventionist state.
better the state.
It is true that states are often involved in too many things, in an unfocused manner. This lack of focus reduces efficiency; trying to get
government better focused on the fundamentals
economic policies,

—

basic education, health, roads, law and order, environmental protection

-

is

a vital step. But focusing on the fundamentals
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is

not a recipe for

minimalist government. The stale has an important role to play

in

The choice

appropriate regulation, social protection, and welfare.

should not be whether the state should be involved but

how

it

gets

Thus the central question should not be the size of the
government but the activities and methods of the government. Countries
involved.

with successful economies have governments that are involved

wide range of

activities. In other

words, the size of the state

in a

in the

economy is not the issue; the issue is the manner of its involvement.
More recently, there has been a growing recognition that the government and private sector are much more intimately entwined. The
government should serve as a complement to markets, undertaking
actions that make markets work better and correcting market failures. In
its
some cases the government has proved to be an effective catalyst

—

actions have helped solve the problem of undersupply of (social)

innovation, for example. But once

has performed

it

its

catalytic role,

the state needs to withdraw.

There are two areas, among others,
important complement to markets

in

which government can serve

— building human

capital

as an

and

transferring technology.

Building

human

capital.

The

role of

human

capital in

economic growth

has long been appreciated. The returns for an additional year of education in the United States, for example, have been estimated at 5 to 15

percent.

The

rate of return

is

even higher

in

developing countries: 24

percent for primary education in sub-Saharan Africa, for example, and

an average of 23 percent for primary education in
countries.

Growth accounting

all

low-income

also attributes a substantial portion of

growth in developing countries to human capital accumulation. The
East Asian economies, for instance, emphasized the role of government
in

providing universal education, which was a necessary part of their

transformation from agrarian to rapidly industrializing economies.
Left to

itself,

capital.

It is

the market will tend not to provide adequate

human

very difficult to borrow against the prospects of future

earnings since

human

capital cannot

be collateralized. These difficulties
The government thus plays an

are especially severe for poorer families.

important role in providing public education, making education more
affordable, and enhancing access to funding.

Transferring technology. Studies of the returns for research and develop-

ment (R&D)
20
far

have consistently found individual
30 percent and social returns of 50 percent or higher,

in industrial countries

returns of

to

exceeding the returns for education. Most studies attribute the

majority of per capita income growth to improvements in technical

change. Robert Solow's pioneering analysis attributed 87.5 percent of
the increase in output per
cal change.

income

man-hour between 1909 and 1949

Another
Republic of Korea

to techni-

study provides strong evidence that per capita

1990 would have been only $2,041
(in 1985 international dollars) if it had relied solely on capital accumulation, far lower than actual per capita income of $6,665. The difference comes from increasing the amount of output per unit of input,
in the

in
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which
•

is

Left to
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partly the result of
itself,

improvements

in technology.

the market underprovides technology. Like investments in

education, investments in technology cannot be used as collateral.

Investments

in

R&D

are also considerably riskier than other types of

investment, and there are

much

larger asymmetries of information that

can impede the effective workings of the market. Technology also has

enormous positive externalities
some respects, knowledge is

in

fits

to society of increased

that the

be too

little

The bene-

investment in technology far outweigh the

benefits to individual entrepreneurs.
will

market does not reward. Indeed,

like a classical public good.

Without government action there

investment in the production and adoption of

new

technology.
•

For most countries, especially developing countries not at the technological frontier, the returns associated with facilitating the transfer of

technology are

much higher

than the returns from undertaking original

research and development. Policies to facilitate the transfer of technol-

ogy are thus one of the keys
policies

is

investing in

Funding of universities

is

development. One aspect of these

to

human

capital, especially in tertiary education.

justified not because

capital of particular individuals but
that

come from enabling

unemployment

the

it

increases the

economy

to

import ideas. Of course,

rates for university graduates are high in

ing countries, and

many

human

because of the major externalities

many develop-

university graduates hold unproductive civil

service jobs. These countries have probably overemphasized liberal arts

education. In contrast, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan (China) have

narrowed the productivity gap with the leading industrial countries by
training scientists and engineers.
•

Another policy

promote the transfer of technology is foreign
example, was able to assimilate
rapidly the knowledge that came from its large inflows of foreign direct
that can

direct investment. Singapore, for

investment.
•

Making government more

effective.

increase the productivity of the

How

can policies be designed that

economy? Again, ends must not be

confused with means. The elements stressed by the Washington consensus may have been reasonable means for addressing the particular set of

problems confronting the Latin American economies in the 1980s, but
they may not be the only, or even the central, elements of policies
aimed at addressing problems in other circumstances.
In which case, one

must reasonably ask, why are such policies

than the exception ?

Why

are they embarked upon by the

without consideration to the

•

human

Part of the strategy for a

IMF

still

the practice rather

with such callous abandon

costs involved?

more productive economy

is

ascertaining the

appropriate role for government, identifying, for instance, the

ways

in

which government can be a more effective complement to markets.
How can one make government more effective in accomplishing
whatever tasks it undertakes? The empirical evidence indicates that an
effective state is vital for development Using data from ninety-four
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countries over three decades, a seminal World
is

not just economic policies and

human

Bank study shows

that

it

capital but the quality of a

country's institutions that determine economic outcomes. Those

environment within which markets

institutions in effect determine the

operate.

•

A weak

institutional environment allows greater arbitrariness

on the part of state agencies and public officials.
Given very different starting points, unique histories, cultures, and
societal factors, how can a state become effective? Part of the answer
that the state should

match

role to

its

its

capability.

What

is

the govern-

ment does, and how it does it, should reflect the capabilities of the
government
and those of the private sector. Low-income countries
often have weaker markets and weaker government institutions. It is
especially important, therefore, that they focus on how they can most
effectively complement markets.
In short, especially in newly emerging democracies, governments must take account of
the capacity of the government to effect change. But there is another dimension to
change more fundamental than the capacity of the government, the capacity of the soci-

—

ety itself to
tries with

absorb change. But there

is

also a suggestion here that in low-income coun-

both weak government institutions and weak markets, the government should

serve as the "agent" of the market rather than the other

market
•

sit

way around. How does

the

with democratic governance?

Capability

is

not destiny. States can improve their capabilities by

reinvig orating their institutions. This

means not only building adminisand norms that provide

trative or technical capacity but instituting rules
officials

with incentives to act in the collective interest while restrain-

ing arbitrary action and corruption.
tional checks
effective

An

independent judiciary,

institu-

and balances through the separation of powers, and

watchdogs can

Competitive wages for

all

restrain arbitrary state action

civil

servants can attract

and increase professionalism and

more

and corruption.
talented people

integrity.

many of the
we examine in

In theory, not just laudable but more of the stuff of the "right thing." But

countries whose initial steps to transition,
this issue

have no

turally ingrained,

some

institutions to reinvigorate.

successful,

Corruption

is

some

not,

not only endemic but cul-

a necessary habit for survival. Effective law enforcement agencies are

nonexistent or part of the law enforcement problem. The judiciary

poses
•

extant. Institutional checks

Governments

are

more

presuppose institutions

effective

interests of their citizens, at the

ownership and stake
Which governments, new to

is

for

all legal

pur-

exist.

when they respond to the needs and
same time giving them a sense of

in the policies.

the trappings

of power, do not begin with such "peopleand consensus build-

centered" principles? Which soon find the process of consultation
ing time-consuming, inefficient,

and an obstacle

to getting things

done? When do

the

sheer burdens of trying to balance so many interests against so few resources sap the
limited energy to provide that sense of ownership when, again, no institutional structures are in place to

accommodate them and when

these institutions are woefully absent?
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Broadening the goals of development. The Washington consensus
advocated use of a small set of instruments (including macroeconomic
stability, liberalized trade, and privatization) to achieve a relatively
narrow goal (economic growth). The post- Washington consensus
recognizes both that a broader set of instruments is necessary and that
the goals are also

much

sured GDP.

We

We seek increases in living
and education, not just increases

broader.

including improved health

standards,
in

mea-

seek sustainable development, which includes preserv-

ing natural resources

and maintaining a healthy environment. We seek

equitable development, which ensures that all groups in society, not just
those at the top, enjoy the fruits of development.

And we

seek demo-

cratic development, in which citizens participate in a variety of

making the decisions that
•

ways

in

affect their lives.

Knowledge has not kept pace with

this proliferation of goals.

We

are

only beginning to understand the relationship between democratization,
inequality, environmental protection,

and growth. What we do know

holds out the promise of developing complementary strategies that can

move

us toward meeting

all

of these objectives. But

that not all policies will contribute to all objectives.
entail trade-offs.

It is

we must recognize
Many policies

important to recognize these trade-offs and make

choices about priorities. Concentrating solely on win-win policies can
lead policymakers to ignore important decisions about win-lose policies.
•

The World Bank's East Asian miracle project was a significant turning
point in the discussion. It showed that the stunning success of the East
Asian economies depended on much more than just macroeconomic
stability or privatization. Without a robust financial system, which the
government plays a huge role in creating and maintaining, it is difficult
to mobilize savings or allocate capital efficiently. Unless the economy
is

competitive, the benefits of free trade and privatization will be

dissipated in rent seeking, not directed toward wealth creation.

public investment in
cient, the

One

market

human

will not

is, it

sustainable, developing countries

monitor and

same

fill

and technology transfers

is

And

set conditions for

if

insuffi-

the gap.

principle that emerges from the ideas he discusses, Stiglitz concludes,

whatever the new consensus
to

capital

cannot be based on Washington.

is

that

If policies are to

be

must claim ownership of them. It is relatively easier
inflation rates and current account balances. Doing the

for financial sector regulation or competition policy is neither feasible nor desir-

able.

The proof of the pudding,

A

et cetera.

second principle of the emerging consensus

called for,

acknowledgment of

the fact that

we do

research and discussion, not just between the
etary

Fund but throughout

achieve our

many

the world,

is

is that

a greater degree of humility

not have

all

World Bank and the

essential if

goals.

Amen.
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we

is

the answers. Continued
International

are to better understand

Monhow to

Stiglitz mentioned the word democracy
unemployment once, direct foreign investment

For the record: In the course of his remarks,
three times, the

The key

once.

word egalitarian

twice,

variables are institutional: the overriding importance of a "robust" finan-

and regulated banking system, a responsive

cial sector, a strong

institutional capacity,

building institutional capacity and restraints on arbitrary action and corruption, the

promotion of competition, a balanced approach

primacy of the market. In his analysis,

to privatization, an effective state, the

institution building

would appear

to take prece-

dence over governance strengthening.

Part Three
Making Democracy Work, Robert Putnam argues that the successful evolution of
what makes democracy work. He analyzes what happened in Italy
when the Italian government transferred almost 80 percent of the national budget from
the central government to the regional and local governments. He concludes that the
In

civic traditions is

only really certain indicator of the potential effectiveness of government
is

number of

the

clubs, social organizations, unions,

population. In short, what counts

munity. The
tive the

more dense

is

and the

like per

to

a given level

thousand heads of

the density of the institutional fabric within a

the institutional fabric per unit of population, the

governmental unit that has jurisdiction over the people

According

at

Putnam, well-developed

more

com-

effec-

in the area in question.

institutional fabric is itself the manifestation

of value systems and horizontal relationships within the community

Mutual

in question.

and cooperation between people within a community result in societal
and arrangements that facilitate economic activity and good government and

trust, respect,

structures

"empower"

is, economic development does not generate a strong
would appear that a strong social fabric is a precursor for eco-

the individual; that

social fabric; rather

it

nomic development. Unwittingly, we may have been putting the cart before the horse.
Such "healthy" social structures, he points out, have to be distinguished from other
structures, vertical structures in which individuals rely not so much on themselves but
on "authorities" above them and on cheating or using "the system" to their own advantage. This type of

and inefficiency

arrangement invariably results

— poor governance and

in patronage, clientism,

social fragmentation.

Putnam

In areas of Italy long subjected to autocratic rule, the absence of a

resulted

dependency,

writes,

community sense

from a habit of insubordination learned from centuries of oppression.

Even the nobles had become accustomed
ernments could be

was successful

.

.

fairly

to obstruction,

and thought

that gov-

cheated without moral obliquity so long as the cheating

.

Insead of recognising that taxes had to be paid, the attitude was rather that

if

group had discovered a profitable evasion, then the other groups had better look
their

own

one
to

interests.

Each province, each

class,

each industry thus endeavoured

to gain at the

expense

of the community. 49
If

one were

to extrapolate

Putnam's findings

to

any of the countries included

in this

Mozambique, Nigeria, Slovakia, El SalAngola, Kenya, Nicaragua, Oromia, Cambodia, and even Israel, and any country

review, whether South Africa, the Philippines,
vador,

emerging from a postconflict

situation, the conclusions might be strikingly similar.
Emerging from hundreds of years of colonialism, oppression, ethnic or ideological
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poverty-stricken, corrupt, with great disparities in wealth, with an under-

abundance of resources, burdened by

many
As

debt, they find themselves without the kind of

framework of which Putnam speaks. They lack a robust

institutional

cases a social fabric

social fabric, in

itself.

ways into the twenty-first century, often blindly following paths of
democracy that may be beyond their capacity to implement, buffeted by an uncaring world, fodder in a global economy, their concepts of sovereignty
and national independence largely outmoded and illusory, their capacity to be "masters
they inch their

transition to forms of

own

of their

fates" a thing of the past, their subjectivity to external constraints in almost

every sphere of action further diminishing what they themselves can accomplish, at the
caprice of whatever capital flows

may

arbitrarily, or

tingly, flatten their tin huts, their place in the

perhaps more accurately, unwit-

pecking order of a more "genteel" global

capitalism dependent on their obsequiousness in the face of

wonder what

this thing

level playing field, the

Or

"democracy"

is all

its

demands, they

may

about, and whether anyone ever heard of a

supposed precursor for a more humane and equal world.

will the lesson of the next

millennium be "To the victor belongs

[all]

the

spoils"? ^8»
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